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Abstract 
The article explores the governance of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among 
soldiers-turned-contractors in the private military labour market.  Using original data 
relating to the UK case, it argues that this governance regime is best understood as a 
political economic process which transcends the public-private divide.  On one side, 
PTSD is managed as an economic issue Ȃ a calculation to be factored into the pursuit of 
profit maximisation.  On the other side, it is managed as a political or social issue Ȃ a 
component of the civil-military relationship in which state and society have a duty to 
care for all those who have served and sacrificed in defence of the nation.  In other 
words, this process is shaped by Ȃ and gives shape to Ȃ the complex professional 
identity of the individuals under examination: they are private military contractors and, 
at the same time, armed forces veterans. 
 
Key Words 
civil-military relations, contractors, post-traumatic stress disorder, private military 
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ǮThere are thousands of mercenaries out here, private military guys like myself who are 
ǯ 
Danny Fitzsimons, speaking from his Iraqi prison cell in 20101  
 
Introduction 
 
Born in 1980, Danny Fitzsimons joined the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers on leaving 
school aged 16.  Two years later he was deployed to Kosovo where one day out on 
patrol he discovered the mutilated remains of a local boy he had recently befriended Ȃ 
an experience, he claims, which has repeatedly come back to haunt him.  He joined the 
Parachute Regiment in 2000, completing tours in Macedonia, Northern Ireland and 
Afghanistan, before being discharged in 2005 after failing a drugs test.  By this time, he 
had also accrued convictions in the UK for possession of an offensive weapon and 
criminal damage.  Like thousands of other armed forces veterans, he then found 
employment as a private military contractor on the post-9/11 battlefields of Iraq where 
he witnessed a colleague burn to death inside a car following an ambush on his convoy Ȃ 
another incident, he says, which has plagued him ever since.  He was sacked for 
unprofessional behaviour by Aegis Defence Services in 2007 and Olive Group the 
subsequent year.  Over this period, he also accumulated further convictions in the UK 
for battery, robbery and possession of ammunitions without a certificate.  In May 2008, 
he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) by a court-appointed 
doctor and soon afterwards collected another conviction in the UK, this time for racially 
aggravated assault.  In August 2009, he once more found employment as a private 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Owen (2010). 
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military contractor in Iraq working for ArmorGroup Ȃ a company purchased by G4S the 
year before.  This was to be the defining moment in his story.  36 hours after arriving in 
Baghdad he shot dead two fellow contractors Ȃ one British, one Australian Ȃ in the heat 
of an argument.  Two years later, he was given a 20 year prison sentence on two counts 
of murder, making him the first Westerner to be convicted in an Iraqi court since the 
beginning of the Coalition invasion.  Despite ongoing efforts to transfer his sentence to 
the UK, he remains today in an Iraqi prison cell (on the details of this account see: 
Gillard 2009; Owen 2010; Head 2011; Hattenstone and Allison 2014; Reprieve 2018). 
 Over the past decade, the story of Danny Fitzsimons has become well known.  
Reflecting on the affair six years after it unfolded, a coroner presiding over one of the 
inquests described it as nothing less than a Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  During the course of the extensive post-incident media 
coverage, the foremost question raised by his family, the families of his victims, legal 
professionals, human rights advocates and even the Chairperson of the United Nations 
Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries was: how did Danny Fitzsimons manage to 
gain employment in ArmorGroup given his fragile mental health and the dangerous 
nature of private military work?  As one of the barristers involved in the legal 
proceedings puts ǣǮ	Ǥǯ
with someone who may have PTSD is give them a gun and allow them to work alongside ǯ (Gillard 2009).  This question received some kind of 
an answer in 2014 when a BBC investigation obtained an internal review of G4S 
recruitment practices circa 2009 showing that in the case of Danny Fitzsimons key 
documents were missing such as a completed application form and past employment 
references (Poling 2014).  The problem, it seems, revolved around poor human 
resource practices.  Thinking more deeply, however, this answer raises many more 
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questions than it resolves.  What happens if soldiers-turned-contractors do show 
symptoms of PTSD during the pre-deployment recruitment process?  What happens if 
they exhibit symptoms while on deployment?  What happens if they display symptoms 
post-deployment?  What training and/or support are they offered at these various 
stages of the employment cycle?  These questions are important because they go 
beyond the singular and high-profile case of Danny Fitzsimons and touch upon the 
wider and less visible experiences of other soldiers-turned-contractors who have 
developed symptoms of PTSD during their transition from the armed forces to the 
private military labour market and beyond. 
 The purpose of the article is to address these questions.  Drawing upon original 
data relating to the UK case, its central argument is that the governance of PTSD among 
soldiers-turned-contractors in the private military labour market is best understood as 
a political economic process which transcends the public-private divide.  On one side, it 
is managed as an economic issue Ȃ a calculation to be factored into the pursuit of profit 
maximisation.  On the other side, it is managed as a political or social issue Ȃ a 
component of the civil-military relationship in which state and society have a duty to 
care for all those who have served and sacrificed in defence of the nation.  In other 
words, this process is shaped by Ȃ and gives shape to Ȃ the complex professional 
identity of the individuals under examination: they are private military contractors and, 
at the same time, armed forces veterans.  Lastly, it is important to emphasise that in 
pursuing this line of reasoning the article develops new connections between the 
disciplines of international relations, political economy, health science and criminology Ȃ a reflection of the fact that the complex life-course trajectories travelled by soldiers-
turned-contractors tend to cut through traditional state-centric disciplinary boundaries 
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in the social sciences and thus require a flexible interdisciplinary approach (Hawks 
2016).  
The argument develops over six further sections.  The next section reviews the 
extant political economic literature on the private military labour market, both to add 
theory and context and to map out ǯoriginal scholarly contribution.  It also ǯǤThe subsequent section explores the symptoms and 
prevalence of PTSD among soldiers-turned-contractors.  The following three sections 
investigate how these symptoms are managed during the pre-deployment, deployment 
and post-deployment stages of the employment cycle.  The final section reviews the ǯ main findings and clarifies its original scholarly contribution.  
 
Theory, Context and Method 
 
The central tenet of political economic analysis is that markets are not self-regulating 
entities animated by profit-maximising economic actors alone Ȃ as the dominant 
neoclassical economic paradigm suggests Ȃ but are dependent upon and constituted 
through a vast array of political and social structures, from international organisations 
and state institutions to familial relationships and religious beliefs.  Take these 
structures away, so the logic goes, and markets as we know them cease to function.  The 
task of political economic analysis is to uncover and explore this dialectical relationship 
between (political and social) structure and (economic) agency, in the process 
challenging the hegemonic status of neoclassical economics (Gamble et al 1996).  Over 
the past three decades or so, this agenda has reached into almost every corner of social 
scientific enquiry Ȃ and the extant scholarship on the rise of the private military labour 
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market is no exception.  Roughly speaking, this scholarship has taken shape in two 
waves.   
The first wave cleaves towards a more neoclassical economic logic, emphasising 
how the shifting landscape of global conflict during the 1990s established the 
conditions for the distinctive supply/demand dynamics which underpin the private 
military labour market (for an overview see: Rosen 2008; Singer 2008).  Impatient to 
realise a much anticipated post-Ǯǯǡacross the 
globe set in motion extensive military downsizing programmes amounting to a 
collective reduction of approximately 7 million soldiers (Singer 2008, p.53).  However, 
the assumption of a peaceful new world order proved to be a false one.  The thinning 
out of superpower military presence had the unintended consequence of releasing 
previously suppressed civil tensions throughout Eastern Europe, Africa and South Asia, 
causing a groundswell of small-scale wars (Kaldor 2012).  While many Western states 
sought to intervene in (some of) these wars, they no longer necessarily had the frontline 
capacity to do so.  In line with neoliberal economic thinking, they resolved this 
conundrum by turning to the growing number of companies seeking to profit from this 
vacuum by repurposing ex-service personnel as private military contractors.  Between 
1990-2000, these contractors were deployed in 80 conflicts worldwide, most notably in 
the former Yugoslavia (Rosen 2008, pp.79-80).  The sector then experienced further 
rapid expansion on the post-9/11 battlefields of the Middle East, where Coalition forces 
found themselves facing down unexpected resistance from insurgents and once again 
turned to the private military labour market to compensate for a shortfall in frontline 
capacity (Isenberg 2009).  At the height of these operations, there were an estimated 
54,000 armed private military contractors working for Coalition forces in Iraq and 
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Afghanistan, and many tens of thousands more carrying out a wide range of unarmed 
logistical and support functions (Krahmann 2012, p.344).   
The second wave assumes a more explicit political economic approach, 
recognising the importance of these supply/demand dynamics, while simultaneously 
emphasising that they are not taking place in an unfettered marketplace.  They are 
instead, so the reasoning goes, dependent upon and constituted through a range of 
political and social structures, ranging from the norm against mercenarism (White 
2018a) and the racial legacies of colonialism (Chisholm 2015) to gender politics (Eichler 
2015) and past military training (Higate 2012).  ǯ
contribution is to advance this second wave.  Issues of health governance have not until 
now received any attention from a political economic perspective Ȃ though they have 
received some consideration from an occupational health perspective (see Dunigan et al 
2013).   Yet, as the following sections illustrate, these issues do tessellate neatly with the 
distinctive picture taking shape in this wave.  In particular, build upon the work of 
Higate (2012) on the relationship between the past military training and the private 
military labour market.  Higate observes how the primary exchange value in this labour 
market is the capacity of contractor ǮǯȋǤǤ
under small arms fire) in a pre-reflexive (or automatic) manner.  He goes on to illustrate 
how this value is initially ǮǯǮǯǡ labour 
market through the aforementioned dynamics of supply and demand, where it is then 
sustained in quasi-military conditions by specialist companies.  As he remarks: Ǯ
conditions under which the value of the sector grew at this time were made possible by 
the availability and willingness of individuals trained in the legitimate discharge of 
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violence Ȃ veterans Ȃ to exploit, and be exploited by, neo-ǯ (Higate 2012, 
p.36). 
While ǯ draws our attention to how the bodies of soldiers-
turned-contractors are readied for deployment in hostile environments through a 
combination of past military training and supply and demand, the present discussion 
focuses on how their traumatised bodies are managed through a similar combination of 
factors.  The institutions in question, however, are not those responsible for drilling the 
bodies of soldiers-turned-contractors in the pre-reflexive discharge of violence, but 
repairing them following exposure to such violence.  For the cohort under examination 
here Ȃ that is, British soldiers-turned-contractors involved in the War on Terror and its 
aftermath Ȃ the relevant institutions are situated in the public and third sectors.  On one 
side are the Ministry of Defence health and wellbeing policies established from mid-
1990s onwards in response to the post-combat difficulties experienced by Gulf War 
veterans.  On the other side are the manifold armed forces charities founded over the 
past century to support soldiers and veterans in need (Mumford 2012).  The 
significance of the welfare-orientated activities undertaken by these institutions has 
risen considerably over recent years in line with the mounting discourse surrounding 
the Military Covenant Ȃ a term which in the popular consciousness has come to 
encapsulate the idea that state and society have a duty to care for all those who have 
served and sacrificed in defence of the nation (Ingham 2014).  Against this backdrop, 
the ensuing sections uncover and explore the political economic processes through 
which these welfare-orientated activities (or political and social structures) intersect 
with the profit-maximising activities of private military companies (or economic 
agency) to manage symptoms of PTSD among soldiers-turned-contractors in the private 
military labour market. 
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 Before commencing with this line of reasoning, however, a note on methodology 
is in order.  The article draws primarily upon original interview data.  Between 2012 
and 2015, I used a combination of purposive and snowball sampling to conduct 
interviews with 18 private military contractors, 13 private military company executives, 
22 armed forces charity workers, three former civil servants and two other 
stakeholders, all with current or past connections to the UK private military labour 
market.2  While my main line of questioning focused on the broad issue of 
demobilisation, 8 contractors (hereafter C1 Ȃ C8), 10 executives (hereafter E1 Ȃ E10), 5 
charity representatives (hereafter R1 Ȃ R5) and both stakeholders (hereafter S1 Ȃ S2) 
offered specific insights into the prevalence and management of PTSD among soldiers-
turned-contractors.  Over the following sections, this dataset is interpreted through a 
political economic lens to construct a narrative on the governance of PTSD in the 
private military labour market.  It is important to recognise the limited generalisability 
of this dataset, however.  Given the sampling techniques used, the extent to which it is 
representative of either the UK private military labour market or similar labour markets 
in other countries remains unclear.  As such, this article should be regarded as a first-
cut singe case study which unearths previously obscured labour market dynamics 
rather than a systematic multi-case study which tests the reach of already known 
dynamics. 
 
Symptoms and Prevalence 
 
                                                 
2 The names of all individuals and organisations in this primary dataset are withheld to protect the 
anonymity of the interviewees. 
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With hindsight, the development of mental health problems among soldiers and 
veterans following exposure to traumatic situations is evident in accounts of war dating 
back to the antiquity.  However, it was not until more recent times that PTSD Ȃ as these 
symptoms came to be known Ȃ was formally recognised and defined by the medical 
community, first appearing in the ǯ1980 Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual as a reaction to the mental health problems experienced by ǡǯ
Classification of Diseases twelve years later (Turnbull 1998).  The diagnosis covers a 
range of symptoms Ȃ listed in Box 1 Ȃ which can be triggered through exposure to 
traumatic events, either straight away or years after they took place.3  Given the nature 
of these symptoms, those suffering from PTSD can be vulnerable, unpredictable and 
sometimes volatile and as a consequence present a danger to themselves and others.  
There is evidence now linking the condition among veterans to physical deterioration, 
suicide, homelessness, aggression, violence and criminality (Ramchand et al 2015) Ȃ 
as the case of Danny Fitzsimons illustrates so vividly.  It is for this reason that a 
growing number of institutions in the public and third sectors have become ever more 
attuned to soldiers and veterans suffering from PTSD.  Yet it is important not to over 
emphasise its prevalence in the armed forces.  While PTSD has come to occupy a 
prominent position in the public consciousness over the past few years, a prominent 
study by Fear et al (2010) suggests that the prevalence of PTSD among UK armed forces 
personnel deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan since 2003 is actually only 4.%. 
 
                                                 
3 It is important to note that respondents need not exhibit every symptom on the Checklist to receive a 
PTSD diagnosis Ȃ they only need to display particular combinations to a certain degree of intensity. 
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Regardless of its prevalence, the medical and policy communities have 
nevertheless established a connection between PTSD and the armed forces.  There is 
debate, however, over the extent to which this connection should automatically be 
Box 1: PTSD Checklist Ȃ Military Version (PCL-M) 
 
1. Repeated, disturbing memories, thoughts, or images of a stressful military experience.  
2. Repeated, disturbing dreams of a stressful military experience.  
3. Suddenly acting or feeling as if a stressful military experience were happening again (as if you 
were reliving it).  
4. Feeling very upset when something reminded you of a stressful military experience.  
5. Having physical reactions (e.g., heart pounding, trouble breathing, or sweating) when 
something reminded you of a stressful military experience.  
6. Avoid thinking about or talking about a stressful military experience or avoid having feelings 
related to it.  
7. Avoid activities or talking about a stressful military experience or avoid having feelings 
related to it.  
8. Trouble remembering important parts of a stressful military experience.  
9. Loss of interest in things that you used to enjoy.  
10. Feeling distant or cut off from other people.  
11. Feeling emotionally numb or being unable to have loving feelings for those close to you.  
12. Feeling as if your future will somehow be cut short.  
13. Trouble falling or staying asleep.  
14. Feeling irritable or having angry outbursts.  
15. Having difficulty concentrating.   ? ?ǤǲuǳǤ  
17. Feeling jumpy or easily startled. 
Source: United States Department of Veterans Affairs 
 13 
extended to the private military labour market.  Some argue it should not on the basis 
that while soldiers engage in offensive combat operations, private military contractors 
only carry out defensive non-combat operations, such as the static and mobile 
protection of persons and property Ȃ a distinction which has its roots in international 
law (Percy 2007).  As one executive observes: ǮThey might have the odd contact with 
hostility, ǯre not going out on regular fighting patrols. They wouldǯ come 
under the same stress levels as a serving soldier out on patrolǯ (E1).  Likewise, one 
contractor remarks: Ǯhe Forces are more in need of ǯǤǯǤǤ incidents ǯȋ1).  Others, however, regard this as a false dichotomy.  To begin 
with, the distinction between offence and defence is highly nebulous in practice, 
meaning contractors are sometimes called upon to directly engage the enemy.  Another 
contractor notes, for instance, that ǮIraq is dangerous work.  Plenty of guys get killed.  
Ex-paras are selected to go out there to do ǯȋ ?).  Furthermore, 
even in more obviously defensive situations, contractors are still wide-open to 
potentially traumatic events.  ǮYǯ
militaryǯǡǡǮyoǯǤ
up at every checkpoint going into the Green Zone.  I was blown up and shot at.  You 
donǯǯ(C3).  Moreover, there is not necessarily a linear 
relationship between the objective severity of a traumatic event and the intensity of any 
resulting PTSD symptoms Ȃ as shown by the original trigger in the Danny Fitzsimons 
case where it was a personal connection with one deceased person rather exposure to a 
bombs and bullets which allegedly caused this event to traumatise him so deeply.  By 
this logic, private military contractors may actually be just as likely to develop 
symptoms of PTSD as soldiers. 
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Importantly, the only large-scale study undertaken on this issue supports the 
latter position.  Dunigan et all (2013) surveyed 660 contractors deployed to a hostile 
environment at least once between 2011 and 2013 Ȃ the vast majority of whom (84%) 
were soldiers-turned-contractors. Approximately one quarter were British and, of 
these, 12% reported symptoms of probable PTSD (Dunigan et al 2013, p.45).4  On the 
surface, this suggests a rate of prevalence three times greater than their public sector 
counterparts.  Yet the precise ratio is open to interpretation.  This is because it is 
difficult to ascertain whether or not the triggering events in question occurred during 
their time in the armed forces or the private military labour market.   One contractor 
succinctly captures this ambigǣǮǯǯ
happened to them.  But iǯ
number of veterans from Iraq and Afghanistanǯ (C4).  Indeed, there is again perhaps no 
better illustration of this opacity than Danny Fitzsimons, who claims to have witnessed 
traumatising events as both soldier and contractor.  Either way, the salient point is that 
the rate of prevalence in the private military labour market is sufficiently high to 
prompt many (if not most) UK-based companies to manage symptoms of PTSD among 
soldiers-turned-contractors in the pre-deployment, deployment and post-deployment 
stages of the employment cycle.  Moreover, their largely profit-maximising activities 
intersect with the aforementioned welfare-orientated programmes rolled out in the 
public and third sectors for soldiers and veterans in need, bringing into effect a complex 
governance regime which transcends the public/private divide.   
 
                                                 
4 Dunigan et al (2013, p.45) also reveal that the prevalence of probable PTSD among US contractors (who 
made up 61% of their sample) is much higher at 32%.  The reasons for this striking difference represent 
an interesting topic for future research.  
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Pre-deployment 
 
Generally speaking, once a company has secured a contract with a client (or contract 
holder) Ȃ most often a government department, multinational corporation or non-
governmental organisation Ȃ it goes about recruiting the requisite number of 
appropriately skilled soldiers-turned-contractors from the private military labour 
market.  In addition to seeking references and recommendations, it has become the 
industry norm to screen applicants for symptoms of PTSD during this process.  Larger 
companies with greater resources usually accomplish this task through an in-house 
doctor, as one executive describes:  
 
We retain a doctor part time.  Each candidate must present a letter signed by 
their GP [General Practitioner] ǯave [diagnosed] mental health ǤǤǯ
about their mental health but our retained doctor can, doctor to doctor.  If our 
doctor signs them off they can work for us (E2).  
 
Smaller companies with fewer resources more commonly open up a direct line of ǡǣǮ
ǯ
and 
Ǥǯǯ
(E3).  When carried out effectively Ȃ and this is clearly not something to be taken for 
granted given the Danny Fitzsimons affair Ȃ the effect of these two approaches is more 
or less the same.  If a doctor declines Ǯǯǡ or if symptoms of PTSD are 
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alluded to in the accompanying references and recommendations, the applicant most 
likely fails the recruitment process on grounds of poor mental health. 
 For those applicants who fall into this category, little in the way of support or 
advice is offered by companies.  Indeed, many executives convey a mixture of relief and 
satisfaction in their ability to avoid such applicants.  One articulates this sentiment in 
the following words: Ǯǯ
with psychological trauma potentially carrying a weapon to protect clients.  We weed 
people oǯȋ ?).  Interestingly, another does express 
frustration about casting these failed applicants back into the labour market, remarking 
how: 
 ǤǯǯǤ
bouncǯǤǯprotection.  The best scenario if ǯ
system, ǯ(E2).   
 
It is notable, though, how the concern here appears to be more for the integrity and 
reputation of the sector than it is for the welfare of the applicants themselves.  While 
this perhaps makes sense from an economic and operational perspective, it reinforces 
the point that the health and wellbeing of applicants is not a priority.  This quote also 
highlights how privacy laws can unintentionally make the already difficult situation 
faced by applicants even more precarious.  As such, once they ǮǯǮǯǮǯǤ  
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To be sure, given that in the above scenarios symptoms of PTSD have been diagnosed by 
a doctor, these applicants do have the option of pursuing treatment in the public 
healthcare system, especially when access to this system is free at the point of entry as 
is the case in the UK.  However, this course of action was not mentioned by 
interviewees, so it remains no more than logical speculation.   
 At first glance, the governance of PTSD among soldiers-turned-contractors in 
this stage of the employment cycle seems to be dominated by the profit-maximising 
activities of companies.  Guided by a straightforward logic of supply and demand, they 
populate their contracts with healthy recruits, screening out and discarding any 
applicants who display symptoms of PTSD.  For companies, in other words, these 
symptoms essentially represent an economic issue to be factored into profit/loss 
calculations, rather than a social issue animated by considerations of welfare.  
Furthermore, those public and third sector institutions which do regard symptoms of 
PTSD among soldiers-turned-contractors as a social issue are conspicuously absent 
from the equation.  This absence, however, is partly a deception caused by the ǯ
organising categories.  The employment cycle under examination is just that Ȃ a cycle.  
As a consequence, the welfare-orientated activities of these institutions identified in the 
ensuing Ǯǯ(most especially) Ǯ-ǯdo in reality feed 
back intǮ-ǯ.  In the interests of crafting a coherent narrative, 
however, these activities are left to later sections.  For now, it is simply enough to draw 
attention to the economic agency of companies in the recruitment process.             
 
Deployment 
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Applicants who successfully pass through the recruitment process sign a contract of 
employment with the company.  In most instances, contracts cover a fixed term (usually 
12 months) and most commonly specify a series of Ǯ ?Ȁ ?ǯȋ weeks on 
deployment followed by three weeks rest) Ȃ a ratio designed to circumvent the UK tax 
system.  During periods of deployment, companies generally depend upon two 
(complementary) strategies to monitor soldiers-turned-contractors for symptoms of 
PTSD.  The first strategy is more light touch and relates to past military training.  In 
recent years, the Ministry of Defence has developed and refined its health and wellbeing 
policies on mental illness:  
 
We recognise mental illness, including Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, as a ǥ
Personnel receive training and briefings to increase their awareness of mental ǥǡ-
Commissioned Officers are routinely trained in methods of suicide prevention 
and stress management.5 
 
The main training programme referred to in these policies is Trauma Risk Management 
(TRiM), a Ǯǡ-ǯ
not to prevent or treat PTSD as suchǡǮ
on to develop formal illnesses and to empower unit leaders ǥ to create the best possible ǯȋ
 et al 2008, p.124).  Most 
                                                 
5 www.army.mod.uk/personnel-and-welfare/health-and-wellbeing.  
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companies rely on the fact that soldiers-turned-contractors operationalise this past 
military training while ǤǣǮǯ
PTSD.  Pretty much 100% industry is.  Our consultants [contractors] have to be aware of 
PTSD.  The kind of people [name of company] employs Ȃ ex-military Ȃ would recognise 
it.  They know it when they see itǯ (E5).  ǮWe have a retired senior Army Warrant Officer 
as our health and safety representativeǯǡ another, Ǯǯs done health and safety in ǯ(E6).  A training consultant with expertise in this area similarly observes how Ǯa lot of them would have been trained in TRiM during their previous military careers ...  
When you deploy in the military a percentage of the Unit needs to be practitioners and 
managers and a lot of these guys will be in the industry nowǯ (S1).  In short, most 
companies assume that the ability to identify and cope with symptoms of PTSD is 
intrinsic to the labour market. 
 For certain companies, however, this assumption does not go far enough and a 
second more interventionist strategy is brought into effect Ȃ namely, paying specialist 
third-party organisations to proactively inculcate TRiM into their workforce.  As one 
executive elucidates:      
 
Through [name of third-party organisation] we use TRiM Ȃ a military procedure 
which is based on peer review.  Our guys are trained in this.  ǯ an online system Ȃ an e-learning platform.  Everyone working for us has to do it once a year.  They 
get tested on it.  Itǯf paper.  If they see someone theyǯ
with acting strange Ȃ ǯǡǯǡǯ
going to the gym Ȃ Ǥǯ
someone up the chain of command to see if thereǯǤ
screening is done in theatreǯ (E7).   
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This strategy is increasingly common.  March on Stress Ȃ a prominent third-party 
organisation founded, not coincidentally, by a former military psychiatrist Ȃ now counts 
many of the largest UK-based private military companies among its client-base.6  This 
trend is driven by two interlinked factors.  The first is ongoing professionalisation.  
Voluntary codes of conduct in the sector Ȃ most notably ANSI/ASIS PSC.1 and ISO 18788 Ȃ have become more cognisant of occupational health and safety in recent years.  The 
second is reputational protection.  Citing a familiar incident, for example, a training 
consultant ǣǮI think security companies started coming to us on the back what 
happened with Danny Fitzsimons, having seen what happened in the media as a 
consequenceǯȋ ?).   In principle at least, both strategies nevertheless play out in the 
same manner.  Those who exhibit symptoms of PTSD on deployment Ȃ especially 
following exposure to a potentially traumatic incident Ȃ will in the first instance be 
supported peer-to-peer in the hostile environment.  If they require more input, ǡǤǮǯook like they ǯǡ
executive explains in simple termsǡǮthey will be brought backǯȋ ?).    
 In this stage of the employment cycle, the governance of PTSD among soldiers-
turned-contractors is clearly shaped by the interplay between the profit-maximising 
activities of companies and the welfare-orientated activities of military institutions in 
the public sector.  To begin with, companies value soldiers-turned-contractors not only 
because past military training has drilled their bodies in the pre-reflexive discharge of 
violence (as per HiǯȌǡbecause this training has equipped them to 
identify and cope with the psychological trauma associated with such violence.  
                                                 
6 www.marchonstress.com/page/p/clients 
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Furthermore, certain companies procure the services of specialist third-party 
organisations specifically to reinforce the influence of this past military training.  This 
suggests that economic agency in the private military labour market is more dependent 
upon underlying political and social structures than was previously recognised.  
Moreover, this dependence further deepens in the post-deployment stage.    
 
Post-deployment 
 
Once soldier-turned-contractors have Ǯǯ
PTSD on deployment, their most immediate source of assistance usually comes through ǯ insurance cover.  In their survey, for instance, Dunigan et al (2013, 
p.58) found that 80% of the sample population had company insurance for deployment-
related health issues.  One executive outlines the process of accessing this assistance: 
 
Getting an insurance pay-out is not an issue because we have decent insurers.  If 
someone is covered they get the insurance benefit.  Our welfare team acts as a 
liaison between the contractor and thǤǲǯ
brǯǳ.  We deal with the case properly (E9).     
 
Despite the confidence expressed here, however, another executive notes certain 
complications when it comes to conditions such as PTSDǣǮThe problem is that insurers 
are cautious about mental ǯǤǯǡǯǤ, so the insurers put limits on ǯ(E7).  If insurance cover alone is not sufficient, some executives indicate a 
willingness to fund Ǯtop upǯ care through the company, though others do not.  Neatly 
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ǡǣǮIn those cases, the company has to ǯ, ǤǯǤǯǯ (E9).  What these quotes 
suggest is that company insurance cover Ȃ with or without Ǯtop upǯ care Ȃ does provide 
these soldiers-turned-contractors with access to professional health care, but for a 
limited time only.      
 Further assistance can be arranged, however, through the hundreds of armed 
forces charities which exist to support those who have served and sacrificed in defence 
of the nation (Ashcroft 2014).  Companies are aware that soldiers-turned-contractors 
technically meet the eligibility criteria for most of these charities and duly take 
advantage of the support on offerǤǮWe do refer people to the veterans ǯǡ
executive articulates, Ǯǯ[name of charity] before now and made enquiries 
to [name of another charity], aǯur people.  Sometimes 
they say ǲyesǳ, sometimes they say ǲnoǳǯ(E9).  This course of action, though, raises 
difficult questions about the ethics of profit-making companies exploiting charitable 
support aimed at individuals who are defined above all else by their public (not private) 
service.  Keen to balance out this equation, a number of executives emphasise the 
charitable work undertaken by their companiesǤǮǯ
involved withǯǡanother executiveǡǮWe have individuals who promote it and do 
fund raisingǯ(E8).  According to one charity worker, however, this balancing act is not a 
sector-wide phenomenon: 
   
We spoke to a big private security [military] company about them donating some ǯǤǯǤǯin it for the profit.  Big corporations are in it for profit, 
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nothing else.  The industry should help the charities who are helping their people 
(R1). 
 
Ethical dilemmas aside, however, it seems clear that some companies look to 
supplement (limited) insurance cover with additional support through the third sector.   
Furthermore, the doors of these charities are open to soldiers-turned-
contractors who develop symptoms of PTSD outside the remit of their company 
insurance cover, either when they are at rest between deployments or once their 
contract of employment has come to an end.  This is particularly notable given that 
opportunities in the private military labour market have been decreasing for a number 
of years now, leaving ever more soldiers-turned-contractors without work (White 
2018b).  Significantly, this is also where our narrative comes full circle because here the 
post-deployment stage blurs into the aforementioned pre-deployment stage where 
soldiers-turned-contractors are seeking out new openings.  It may be the case, in other 
words, that previously deployed soldiers-turned-contractors who are failing to find 
employment because they are exhibiting symptoms of PTSD during the recruitment 
process are in fact accessing support through armed forces charities.  To suggest that 
charities help all the soldiers-turned-contractors who fall through the cracks in the pre-
deployment, deployment and post-deployment stages would be wrong, however.  
Dunigan et alǯ (2013, p.63) study, for instance, discovered that only 28% of the sample 
population with probable PTSD received mental health treatment in 12 months prior to 
the survey.  Contemplating the worse-case scenarios arising from this situation, one 
contractor grimly reflects: ǮGod knows how many end up in prison or lose their lives 
through heavy drinking.  Guys off the Circuit with PTSD.  These are former colleagues 
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ǯking about.  Once great warriors, Ǥǯǯ (C5).  
The parable of Danny Fitzsimons once more comes to mind. 
In this stage of the employment cycle, the governance of PTSD among soldiers-
turned-contractors is primarily shaped by the interplay between the profit-maximising 
activities of companies and welfare-orientated activities of charities in the third sector.  
In the first instance, companies address symptoms of PTSD through their insurance 
cover, which is an accepted cost of doing business in any sector and factors into 
profit/loss calculations almost by default.  While some companies do then Ǯǯǡthis process is not entirely divorced from their balance 
sheets Ȃ it remains in part an economic issue.  These symptoms are only treated as a 
genuine social issue in the third sector, where armed forces charities fill in the some of 
the gaps exposed through insurance cover Ǯǯ.  To be sure, certain 
companies do engage in charitable work to facilitate this gap-filling, thereby cutting 
across the otherwise stark distinction between profit-maximising and welfare-
orientated activities.  Yet this does not detract from the overarching point that once 
again economic agency in the private military labour market is seemingly dependent 
upon and constituted through an array of political and social structures to a greater 
degree than was previously understood.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The article set out to address a series of questions concerning the governance of PTSD 
among soldiers-turned-contractors in the private military labour market.  Using the UK 
case, it has now illustrated how throughout the pre-deployment, deployment and post-
deployment stages of the employment cycle, PTSD is managed as both an economic 
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issue and a political and social issue by a range of actors across the public-private 
spectrum.  The economic side of the picture is shaped by the profit-maximising 
activities of companies which manage symptoms of PTSD using a combination of 
strategic recruitment (hiring former soldiers and screening them for symptoms), 
outsourcing (procuring training programmes from third-party organisations) and 
insurance policies (covering those who develop symptoms on deployment).  Some 
companies do also engage in more benevolent activities such as providing Ǯǯ
and undertaking charitable work, though these activities are never entirely detached 
from the pursuit of profit.  The political and social side of the picture is shaped by the 
welfare-orientated activities of military institutions and armed forces charities which 
first equip soldiers-turned-contractors with the ability to identify and cope with PTSD 
on the battlefield, before assisting them when they require further help as part of the 
civil-military relationship in which state and society have a duty to care for all those 
who have served and sacrificed in defence of the nation.  While the resulting governance 
mechanisms are patchy and uneven to say the least, take them away and the private 
military labour market as we know it ceases to function. 
 In developing this picture, the article makes a number of original contributions.  
To begin with, it augments the second wave of political-economic scholarship which 
seeks to uncover the various political and social structures responsible for shaping 
supply/demand dynamics in the private military labour market.  Alongside the norm 
against mercenarism (White 2018a), the racial legacies of colonialism (Chisholm 2015) 
gender politics (Eichler 2015) and past military training (Higate 2012), it is now 
possible to add the welfare-orientated activities of military institutions in the public 
sector and armed forces charities in the third sector.  Furthermore, it is important to 
emphasise the connections between these activities and past military training in 
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particular.  While Higate illustrates how past military training prepares the bodies of 
soldiers-turned contractors for the exercise of violence in hostile environments, the 
preceding sections show how the welfare-orientated activities of military institutions 
and armed forces charities help to repair their bodies following exposure to such 
violence.  These two analyses, in other words, reveal a set of complementary processes.  
To the extent that Higate is correct in asserting that the capacity of soldiers-turned-
contractors to deal with violence is intrinsic to their exchange value on the private 
military labour market, this article has also uncovered a previously unacknowledged 
dimension of this underlying value.  All these more specific points, of course, contribute 
towards the overarching point that understanding the dynamics of the private military 
labour market Ȃ and all other labour markets, for that matter Ȃ requires us to explore 
not just the economic agency of clients, companies and contractors but also a range of 
constitutive political and social structures. 
Finally, the article raises some important questions for future enquiry, the 
foremost of which concern issues of harm and responsibility.  As noted earlier, the 
governance regime for managing PTSD among soldier-turned-contractors is patchy and 
uneven at best.  It is therefore inevitable that individuals such as Danny Fitzsimons will 
fall through the cracks causing harm to themselves and others.  Who should take 
responsibility for these harms?  What, if anything, needs to change?  While there is not 
space here to reflect upon these questions in any detail, it is possible to sketch out some 
initial answers so as to highlight the basic contours of debate.  In so doing, it is first ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǡǤ ? ?Ȍin the 
preceding pages Ȃ that the dynamics of private military labour market are dependent Ǯǯ-turned-contractors Ǯto exploit, and be exploited by, 
neo-ǯ (emphasis added).  These two dimensions of exploitation represent a 
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valuable axis around which to approach the issues of harm and responsibility raised 
here.   
First consider the harms done to soldiers-turned-contractors themselves.  If 
soldiers-turned-contractors are viewed as empowered actors who are consciously Ǯ-ǯ, fully aware of the corresponding risks to their person, 
then it falls upon them to assume responsibility for their own welfare.  If, by contrast, Ǯ-ǯ, 
insufficiently aware of the corresponding risks to their person, then it falls upon clients 
and companies to take on greater responsibility for the welfare of the contractors on 
their payrolls.  Next consider the harms done by soldiers-turned-contractors to others.  
If soldiers-turned-Ǯing 
neo-ǯǡupon them to assume responsibility for any 
harms done to others as a consequence of their work activities.  If, however, they are Ǯ-ǯǡthen again 
it falls upon clients and companies to take greater responsibility for any harms done to 
others as a result of their work activities.  Expressed in more concrete terms, should 
Danny Fitzsimons sit in an Iraqi prison cell while G4S and its clients avoid formal 
sanction, or should these institutions also be held to account?  The implication of ǯ-sided nature of exploitation in the private military 
labour market is that all parties should assume responsibility for these harms to some 
degree.  This is not a debate for this article, however.  For now, it is enough to note that 
the foregoing discussion clearly raises some interesting questions for future enquiry.    
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